Central Bank Communication as Public Opinion? Experimental Evidence
(with Dominik Duell and Will Lowe)
Research
Divided Committees and Strategic Vagueness
(with Colin Krainin)
Opportunistic, not Optimal Delegation: The Political Origins of Central Bank Independence
(with Julia Gray and Jakob Willisch)
News
EITM Europe 2021 Text As Data: Theory and Application
27 January 2021The program provides an introduction to the most recent developments in quantitative textual analysis and with a particular focus on linking applications with theory. Free participation, subject to conditions, 14 June to 25 June 2021 on an online platform. See the program here
Opportunistic not Optimal Policy is accepted at CPS
19 May 2020Economists have long argued that central banks ran by technocrats have greater independence from the government. But in many countries, politically experienced central bankers are at the helm, including even highly independent central banks.
Crafting Consensus
2 May 2020I am so excited to say that my book is finally available on the Oxford University Press website.
You can buy it here.