News

Economists have long argued that central banks ran by technocrats have greater independence from the government. But in many countries, politically experienced central bankers are at the helm, including even highly independent central banks. To explain the level of central bank independence awarded, we develop a formal model where nominating politicians screen central bankers for their political ambitions. We find evidence that the reelection strategy of the nominating politician is an important predictor of the level of central bank independence.

I am so excited to say that my book is finally available on the Oxford University Press website.

You can buy it here. 

I’m delighted to be co-hosting a workshop entitled “Opportunities and Challenges in Economic Policy Communications” at the Central Bank of Ireland on January 17. Follow my hashtag #CBAficionado. Workshop program is here. 

So pleased that our paper “Central Bank Communication as Public Opinion? Experimental Evidence” was selected for the David A Lake best paper presented at IPES 2018. You can read it here.

So happy to be teaching at Waseda’s Summer Research Course in Tokyo, Japan (September 9 to September 20). I also finally managed to move my course over to the cloud, and setting it up was a big learning experience, but I think it will hopefully make for less troubleshooting in the classroom and more time to talk text analysis. 

Another fabulous cohort of excited students learning QTA at the summer school at Essex.