Forthcoming paper at EJPE, coauthored with Colin Krainin, examines the relationship between Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) design and policy communications.[Read More about New paper at European Journal of Political Economy ]
New paper (with Mark Hallerberg) published at JCMS. We examine the determinants of the Council of Ministers’s editing of the European Commission recommendations to Member States after the introduction of the European Semester in the period 2011–18. Unlike previous work, we find little evidence of a systematic relationship between euroscepticism and textual editing.
The program provides an introduction to the most recent developments in quantitative textual analysis and with a particular focus on linking applications with theory. Free participation, subject to conditions, 14 June to 25 June 2021 on an online platform. See the program here
Economists have long argued that central banks ran by technocrats have greater independence from the government. But in many countries, politically experienced central bankers are at the helm, including even highly independent central banks. To explain the level of central bank independence awarded, we develop a formal model where nominating politicians screen central bankers for their political ambitions. We find evidence that the reelection strategy of the nominating politician is an important predictor of the level of central bank independence.
I am so excited to say that my book is finally available on the Oxford University Press website.
You can buy it here.
I’m delighted to be co-hosting a workshop entitled “Opportunities and Challenges in Economic Policy Communications” at the Central Bank of Ireland on January 17. Follow my hashtag #CBAficionado. Workshop program is here.