

**GV907-7-FY
Political Economy
2020 – 2021**

Lecturer and Module Supervisor

Dr Nicole Rae Baerg

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Room: 5.419

Office Hours: Tuesdays 13:00-15:00

Module Administrator

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Module available for Study Abroad students: Yes No

ASSESSMENT: This module is assessed by 100% coursework

INSTANT DEADLINE CHECKER

Must be submitted by 09:45am on the day of the lecture

Assignment Title	Due Date	Coursework Weighting*	Feedback Due
2 Critical Writing Assignments	09.45am on day of lecture (1 per term)	40%	
Research Paper Preregistration Presentation	09.45am Week 10	15%	
Peer Assessment of Preregistration Plan	09.45am Week 22 (hand in) and Week 23 (hand back)	15%	
Final Scientific Paper Preregistration Plan	09.45am Week 25	30%	

* A note about weightings: We need weightings of coursework to **add up to 100%**. The university system automatically calculates the aggregate mark based on whether there is an exam or not and adjusts accordingly.

STUDY ABROAD ASSESSMENT

This class cannot be taken by study abroad students

TOP READS

All readings per week are **compulsory** and ***** readings are recommended**

MODULE DESCRIPTION

This is a graduate course on political economy. The course bridges together topics in international relations, comparative political economy, and economics. The goals of the course are to (a) introduce students to contemporary scholarly research on political economy topics, (b) introduce students to strategic models in political science using substantive applications, and (c) stimulate students to form original ideas for promising quantitative research projects in the area of contemporary political economy

The course is broken into a number of themes. In these weeks, we will examine how domestic and international politics drive trade, investment, financial, and immigration policies and outcomes. We will also look at the relationship between political institutions and economic outcomes as well as the effects of economic phenomenon on institutions. The class emphasizes the theoretical core and some current debates in the field but also aims to expose students to some nuts and bolts of topics related to political economy (broadly defined) and chief methods by which scholars acquire knowledge of the subject.

MODULE & AIMS

Students will require, use and develop the following key skills:

- Transfer of ideas: students will be helped to follow and assess quantitative research in other modules – parties and elections, comparative politics, IR, and so on;
- Improving independent learning and performance: Students will learn to address their own research topics in a quantitative framework with an eye towards scholarly publication;
- Communication, interaction, and peer review: Classes involve not only questions from me but also group discussions; students are required to give formal feedback to other students in written form;
- Writing: Students learn how to theorize, generate empirically testable hypotheses, and report on and discuss results of quantitative analyses.

MODULE OUTCOMES

By the end of the module students should achieve the following learning outcomes:

- read, understand, and evaluate quantitative analyses and scholarly work published in the leading journals;
- understand evaluation methods for particular research questions, research designs, and variables;
- use various statistical methods, from to multivariate regression models, experiments, and measuring variables of interest;
- analyse quantitative data;
- complete a replication activity and present it.

MODULE STRUCTURE AND TEACHING

The module will run over 20 weeks. This module will be delivered with a two-hour weekly seminar that will be available to students off-campus

The module is the core module for students on the MA/MSC/MRes in Political Economy and can be taken as an option by students on other Masters courses in the Department of Government.

What we expect of you during lecture and classes:

- Having done the required reading.
- To pay attention and take notes as necessary.
- To think about the readings and lectures notes before the class, and be ready to discuss them: try to identify the key assumptions in the texts; map the structure of the argument; underline the conclusions. Highlight to yourself points you don't understand. Ask yourself whether you agree with the text, whether you can identify weaknesses or gaps in the argument, and what could someone who disagrees with it argue against it.
- To offer your participation as required (answering questions, asking questions etc.). Learning about and discussing these texts is a communal endeavour and it is a matter of good citizenship to contribute. Further, part of what we want you to achieve, and what we mark you for, is clear and confident oral presentation. You are expected to answer questions, raise new points, and contribute to the progression of discussion in class.

ASSESSMENT

This module is assessed by 100% coursework.

Coursework will consist of 2 critical writing assignment (20% each), a research paper powerpoint presentation (no audio) (15%), peer assessment including a scientific write up approx 1500 words (15%), and a scientific paper preregistration form which completes the .Rmd file I give you (30%) approx 3500.

The 2 critical writing assignments should be handed in at the start of class on the week that we will discuss them. **You are required to do 2 in total, 1 per term.**

At the end of the Autumn semester (Week 10), you are responsible to hand in a **paper presentation that specifies your preregistration project (no audio just slides)**. This must specify the research question (RQ), the main dependent variable (DV), the independent variable (IV), the statistical method (likely OLS) that you will use to, the dataset that you will use and an idea about what data you will use. **You are not allowed to change your mind about the research project so make sure that you find a project that you like early on.**

At the end of the Spring semester you are required to hand in a complete scientific preregistration plan for peer review (i.e. a research note). This document should be

aprox1500 words, 12 font, 1 inch margins, double spaced. You are also required to review one of your peer's research note, which will be handed back to them, one week later. You are finally expected to hand in an aprox 3500 research preregistration plan on the last day of class in the .Rmd file that I give you.

STUDY ABROAD ASSESSMENT

This class is not available for study abroad

COURSEWORK SUBMISSION

How to submit your essay using FASER

You will be able to access the online submission system via your myEssex portal or via <https://FASER.essex.ac.uk>. FASER allows you to store your work-in-progress. This facility provides you with an ideal place to keep partially completed copies of your work and ensures that no work, even drafts, is lost. If you have problems uploading your coursework, you should contact ltt@essex.ac.uk. You may find it helpful to look at the FASER guide <http://www.essex.ac.uk/it/elearning/faser/default.aspx>. If you have any questions about FASER, please contact your administrator or refer to the handbook.

Under NO circumstances is your coursework to be emailed to the administrators or the lecturer. This will NOT be counted as a submission.

Coursework deadline policy for postgraduates

The university has guidelines on what is acceptable as extenuating circumstances for later submission of coursework. If you need to make a claim, you should upload your coursework to FASER and submit a late submission of coursework form which can be found here: <http://www.essex.ac.uk/students/exams-and-coursework/late-submission.aspx>. This must be done within seven days of the deadline. FASER closes for all deadlines after seven days. The Late Submissions committee will decide whether your work should be marked and you will be notified of the outcome.

If you experience significant longer-term extenuating circumstances that prevent you from submitting your work either by the deadline or within seven days of the deadline, you should submit an Extenuating Circumstances Form for the Board of Examiners to consider at the end of the year <http://www.essex.ac.uk/students/exams-and-coursework/ext-circ.aspx>.

Extensions

PGT students may apply for an extension if they have a deadline approaching that they know they will not be able to meet. ONLY the Graduate Director has authority to grant extensions. Extensions are only approved IN ADVANCE of the deadline. Students must apply to the Graduate Director, via the Graduate Administrator, using the Extension form available on Moodle or from the Graduate Administrator. You MUST provide a reason for the request and EVIDENCE that supports your application.

Plagiarism

Plagiarism is a very serious academic offence and whether done wittingly or unwittingly it is your responsibility. **Ignorance is no excuse!** The result of plagiarism could mean receiving a mark of zero for the piece of coursework. In some cases, the rules of assessment are such that a mark of zero for a single piece of coursework could mean that you will fail your degree. If it is a very serious case, you could be required to withdraw from the University. It is important that you understand right from the start of your studies what good academic practice is and adhere to it throughout your studies.

The Department will randomly select coursework for plagiarism checks and lecturers are very good at spotting work that is not your own. **Plagiarism gets you nowhere; DON'T DO IT!**

Following the guidance on referencing correctly will help you avoid plagiarism.

Please familiarise yourself with the University's policy on academic offences:

<http://www.essex.ac.uk/about/governance/policies/academic-offences.aspx>.

Extenuating circumstances for late submission of coursework

The university has guidelines on what is acceptable as extenuating circumstances for later submission of coursework. If you need to make a claim, you should upload your coursework to FASER and submit a late submission of coursework form which can be found [here](http://www.essex.ac.uk/students/exams-and-coursework/late-submission.aspx): <http://www.essex.ac.uk/students/exams-and-coursework/late-submission.aspx>. This must be done within seven days of the deadline. FASER closes for all deadlines after seven days. The Late Submissions committee will decide whether your work should be marked and you will be notified of the outcome.

If you experience significant longer-term extenuating circumstances that prevent you from submitting your work either by the deadline or within seven days of the deadline, you should submit an Extenuating Circumstances Form for the Board of Examiners to consider at the end of the year <http://www.essex.ac.uk/students/exams-and-coursework/ext-circ.aspx>.

READINGS

Module Outline

Week 2: Political Economy and Institutions

Diermeyer, Daniel and Keith Krehbiel. (2003). "Institutionalism as a Methodology." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 15(2): 123-144.

Hale, Farrell. (2005). "Trust and Political Economy: Institutions and the Sources of Inter-firm Cooperation." *Comparative Political Studies* 38(5): 459-483.

Gilligan, Michael J. and Leslie Johns. (2012). "Formal Models of International Institutions," *Annual Review of Political Science* 15: 221-243.

Week 3: Interest Groups and Lobbies --Trade

Grossman, Gene M., and Ethan Helpman. (1994). "Protection for Sale." *The*

American Economic Review, 84 (4): 833–850.

***Rogowski, Ronald. (1987). "Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade," *American Political Science Review*, 81(4): 1121-1137.

Hiscox, Michael J. (2001). "Class Versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade," *International Organization* 55 (Winter 2001): 1-46.

Baccini, Leonardo, Pablo M. Pinto, and Stephen Weymouth. "The distributional consequences of preferential trade liberalization: firm-level evidence." *International Organization* 71.2 (2017): 373-395.

Week 4: Democracy, Regime Type and Trade

Olson, Mancur. (1993). "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," *American Political Science Review* 87(3): 567-576.

***North, Douglass C. and Barry R. Weingast. (1989). "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England." *The Journal of Economic History*, 49 (December): 803-832.

***Weingast, Barry. (1997). "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law." *American Political Science Review*, 91: 245-63.

Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2012). The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation: Reply. *The American Economic Review*, 102(6): 3077-3110. [Replication Link](#)

Kono, Daniel Y. (2006). "Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency," *American Political Science Review* 100(3): 369-384.

Week 5: Voting, Enfranchisement, and Regimes

Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. (2000). "Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality and Growth in Historical Perspective." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 115: 1167-1199.

Boix, Carles. (2003). *Democracy and Redistribution*. New York: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 1

Spirling, Arthur. (2016). "Democratization and Linguistic Complexity: The Effect of Franchise Extension on Parliamentary Discourse, 1832–1915," *Journal of Politics*, 78(1): 120-136 [Replication Link](#)

Week 6: Emigration

Leblang, David, Jennifer Fitzgerald and Jessica Teets. Date. "Defying the Law of Gravity: The Political Economy of International Migration." *World Politics. World Politics* 66.03 (2014): 406-445. [Replication Link](#)

Abramitzky, Ran, Leah Platt Boustan, and Katherine Eriksson. (2012). "Europe's Tired, Poor, Huddled Masses: Self-Selection and Economic Outcomes in the Age of Mass Migration," *American Economic Review* 102(5): 1832-56.

Bearce, David and Jennifer A. Laks Hutnick. (2011). "Toward an Alternative Explanation for the Resource Curse: Natural Resources, Immigration, and Democratization," *Comparative Political Studies*, 44(6): 689-718. [Replication Link](#)

Week 7: Immigration

Hainmueller, Jens and Dominik Hangartner. (2013). "Who gets a Swiss passport? A natural experiment in immigrant discrimination." *American Political Science Review*, 107(01): 159-187.

Malhotra, Neil, Yotam Margalit, and Cecilia Hyunjung Mo. (2013). "Economic Explanations for Opposition to Immigration: Distinguishing Between Prevalence and Conditional Impact." *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(2): 391-410. [Replication Link](#)

Shin, Adrian J. "Tyrants and Migrants: Authoritarian Immigration Policy." *Comparative Political Studies* 50.1 (2017): 14-40.

Steinmayr, Andreas. "Exposure to refugees and voting for the far-right:(unexpected) results from Austria." Working Paper. (2016).

Week 8: Remittances

Smith, Alastair. (2008). "The Perils of Unearned income." *The Journal of Politics* 70.03: 780-793.

Doyle, David. (2015). "Remittances and Social Spending." *American Political Science Review* 109.04: 785-802.

Singer, David. (2010). "Migrant Remittances and Exchange Rate Regimes in the Developing World." *American Political Science Review*, 104(2): 307-323.

Week 9: Presidential and Parliamentary Democracy

***Tsebelis, George, (1997). "Decision-Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartism." *British Journal of Political Science*, 289-325.

Nielson, Daniel L. (2003). "Supplying Trade Reform: Political Institutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income Presidential Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 47(3): 470-491.

Frye, Timothy. (1997). "The Politics of Institutional Choice: Post-Communist Presidencies." *Comparative Political Studies*, 30: 523-552.

Catalinac, Amy. "Positioning under Alternative Electoral Systems: Evidence from Japanese Candidate Election Manifestos." *American Political Science Review* (2017): 1-18. [Replication Link](#)

Week 10: Elections

Boix, Carles. (1999). "Setting the rules of the game: the choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies." *American Political Science Review* 93(03): 609-624.

Lizzeri, Alessandro, and Nicola Persico. (2001). "The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives." *American Economic Review* 91: 225–239.

Bubeck, Johannes, and Nikolay Marinov. "Process or Candidate: The International Community and the Demand for Electoral Integrity." *American Political Science Review* (2017): 1-20. [Replication File](#)

Week 11: Inequality

Milanovic, Branko. (2000). "The Median-Voter Hypothesis, Income Inequality, and Income Redistribution: an Empirical Test with the Required Data." *European Journal of Political Economy* 16: 367-410.

Iversen, Torben, and David Soskice. (2006). "Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others." *American Political Science Review*, 100 (02): 165–181.

Li, Quan, and Adam Resnick. (2003). "Reversal of fortunes: Democratic institutions and foreign direct investment inflows to developing countries." *International Organization*, 57(01): 175-211.

Winter Break

Week 16: Institutions and Commitment

Milgrom, Paul, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast. (1990). "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Medieval Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs." *Economics and Politics* 2 (March): 1-23.

Boix, Carles, and Milan W. Svobik. "The foundations of limited authoritarian government: Institutions, commitment, and power-sharing in dictatorships." *The Journal of Politics* 75.2 (2013): 300-316. [Replication Link](#)

Tsai, Lily. (2007). "Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China." *American Political Science Review* 101 (2): 355-372.

Week 17: Exchange Rate Regimes

Guisinger, Alexandra, and David Andrew Singer. (2010). "Exchange rate proclamations and inflation-fighting credibility." *International Organization*, 64(02): 313-337.

Bodea, Cristina. (2014). Fixed Exchange Rates, Independent Central Banks and Price Stability in Post- Communist Countries: Conservatism and Credibility. *Economics and Politics*, 26(2): 185-211.

Betz, Timm and Andrew Kerner (Forthcoming). "Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation and WTO Dispute Initiation in Developing Countries." *International Organization*.

Week 18: International Finance and Capital mobility

Basinger, Scott J., and Mark Hallerberg. (2004). "Remodeling the competition for capital: How domestic politics erases the race to the bottom." *American Political Science Review*, 98(20): 261-276.

Jensen, Nathan. (2008). "Political Risk, Democratic Institutions, and Foreign Direct Investment," *Journal of Politics*, 1040-1052. [Replication Files](#)

Mosley, Layna, and David Andrew Singer. (2008). "Taking stock seriously: Equity-market performance, government policy, and financial globalization." *International Studies Quarterly*, 52(2): 405-425.

Week 19: Intra-Party Politics

Kemahlioglu, Ozge. (2011). "Jobs in politicians' backyards: Party leadership competition and patronage." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 23(4): 480-509.

Kirkland, Justin H., and Jonathan B. Slapin. "Ideology and strategic party disloyalty in the US house of representatives." *Electoral Studies* 49 (2017): 26-37. [Replication Link](#)

Shih, Victor, Christopher Adolph, and Mingxing Liu. (2012). "Getting ahead in the communist party: explaining the advancement of central committee members in China." *American Political Science Review* 106(01): 166-187. [Replication Link](#)

Week 20: Courts

Vanberg, Georg. (2001). "Legislative-judicial relations: A game-theoretic approach to constitutional review." *American journal of political science*, 346-361.

Staton, Jeffrey K. and Georg Vanberg. (2008). "The Value of Vagueness: Delegation, Defiance, and Judicial Opinions." *American Journal of Political Science*, 58 (3): 504-519.

Gabel, Matthew J., Clifford J. Carrubba, Caitlin Ainsley, and Donald M. Beaudette. (2012). "Of Courts and Commerce." *The Journal of Politics*, 74 (4): 1125-1137.
[Replication Link](#)

Week 21: Central Banks

Bodea, Cristina & Raymond, Hicks. (2015). Price Stability and Central Bank Independence: Discipline, Credibility and Democratic Institutions. *International Organization*; 69(1): 35-61. [Replication Link](#)

Meade, Ellen and David Stasavage. (2008). "Publicity of Debate and the Incentive to Dissent: Evidence from the US Federal Reserve," *The Economic Journal*, 118: 695-717.

Baerg, Nicole Rae, and Will Lowe. (2018). "A Textual Taylor Rule: Estimating Central Bank Preferences Combining Topic and Scaling Methods." Forthcoming. *Political Science Research and Methods* [Replication Link](#)

Week 22: International Institutions

Johns, Leslie. (2007). "A servant of two masters: communication and the selection of international bureaucrats." *International Organization* 61.02: 245-275.

Gray, Julia. (2009). International Organization as a Seal of Approval: European Union Accession and Investor Risk. *American Journal of Political Science*.

Fang, Songying, and Randall W. Stone. (2012). "International organizations as policy advisors." *International Organization* 66(04): 537-569.

Week 23: Sovereign Borrowing, Debt, and Financial Crises

Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth S. Rogoff. (2011). "From financial crash to debt crisis." *The American Economic Review* 101.5: 1676-1706.

Walter, Stefanie. (2016). "Crisis politics in Europe: Why austerity is easier to implement in some countries than in others." *Comparative Political Studies* 49(7): 841-73.

Baerg, Nicole Rae, and Mark Hallerberg. (2016). "Explaining Instability in the Stability and Growth Pact: The Contribution of Member State Power and Euroskepticism to the Euro Crisis." *Comparative Political Studies* 49.7: 968-1009.
[Replication Link](#)

Week 24: Opposition to Globalization

Hainmueller, J., & Hiscox, M. J. (2007). Educated preferences: Explaining attitudes toward immigration in Europe. *International Organization*, 61(02), 399-442.

Margalit, Yotam. (2012). "Lost in Globalization: International Economic Integration and the Sources of Popular Discontent," *International Studies Quarterly*, 56: 484-500

Megumi Naoi and Ikuo Kume. (2011). "Explaining Mass Support for Agricultural Protectionism: Evidence from a Survey Experiment During the Global Recession," *International Organization*, 65: 771-795

Week 25: Research Session (in class) and final paper plan due